Posted by Karen McKim · November 25, 2018 10:31 PM
Most local government officials take responsibility for the accuracy of their work product. They don’t need anyone to pass a law telling them: “Don’t forget to check your work!”
No city treasurer would refuse to check accuracy of property-tax bills.
No county executive would release a report on annual expenditures without double-checking the addition.
But the Wisconsin County Clerks Association is officially on record: They don’t want to.
And their work product is our election results.
The WCCA statement, written and submitted by Dane County Clerk Scott McDonell, came in response to the Wisconsin Elections Commission’s September announcement that they were considering two election-security improvements:
- The first proposal involved the only accuracy-checks the Commission has authority to order: once-every-two-years audits of individual voting machines, which are performed by municipal (not county) clerks. These audits have limited value, but are far better than nothing. The Commission said it was considering ordering more machines audited than in previous years and requiring the audits to be completed before election results are declared final. Unfortunately, there’s nothing the WEC can do about the fact that these audits are limited to November elections in even-numbered years.
- The second proposal would move Wisconsin slightly toward compliance with national election-security standards. The Commission said it was considering encouraging county clerks to perform election audits of the type that might, if done widely, confirm that the Election-Night results had identified the right winner–or give them opportunity to correct the results if they had not.
WCCA’s response was swift, naïve, and irresponsible. The county clerks didn’t want the Commission to require, or even encourage, the county clerks to perform genuine election audits.
Perhaps sensing they are defending the losing side in a national trend (they are), the county clerks also described how they want election audits restricted:
- They don’t wanna check accuracy until after they have certified final election results.
- They don’t wanna check accuracy for any but the top race on the ballot.
- And they want the State to pay extra if it even suggests they check accuracy.
I’m not making that up. Scott McDonell’s memo to the Wisconsin Elections Commission is reproduced, verbatim, below.
About delaying audits until after certification: McDonell wrote that the WCCA believes our paper ballots “should be treated like evidence and remain undisturbed” until after the clerks have certified the results and know whether anyone wants a recount. Join me in a prayer that the Trial Judges Association doesn’t share this idea about the proper use of evidence. Imagine our courts refusing to look at evidence until after they’ve reached their verdict and know whether anyone wants to appeal.
About auditing only the top race on the ballot: The WCCA’s message could be restated: “If you want us to protect the US Senate election, forget about protecting the Governor’s election.” Hackers are delighted to know ahead of time which race will be off limits to them, and which races will be on an honor system.
About making the state pay extra for accuracy: With this statement, the WCCA clearly rejected the idea that accuracy is a normal managerial responsibility. Imagine a parks manager telling the county budget manager: “I signed off on this accounting of the user fees we collected. If you want me to make sure it’s right, you’ll need to pay extra.”
For a final, Trumpian flourish, the clerks blatantly misrepresented the findings of a study by MIT, Harvard, and the UW Madison researchers (Learning from Recounts, 2017). The WCCA memo claimed the researchers had declared that “hand counts of election results are inherently inaccurate.” Compare that to the researchers’ actual words:
“…careful hand counting in a recount is the gold standard for assessing the true vote totals — in large part because of the greater focus on a single contest, more deliberate processing of ballots, and careful observation by campaign officials and other interested parties….”
The researchers ultimately expressed no preference for either method of counting, concluding: “ballots originally counted by computer … appear to be at least as accurate as ballots originally counted by hand.“
* * *
Wisconsin statutes give county clerks the buck-stops-here responsibility for election results’ accuracy. Municipal clerks cannot verify results in federal, state, and county races; they have access to the ballots from only their own city, village, or town. And the WEC is the legal custodian of no ballots at all; has only a few days after county certification before they must certify; and has no statutory authority to question results the county has certified.
We must insist the county clerks fulfill their responsibility. They have the paper ballots. They have the time. Modern election-audit practices would allow them to verify a few races on the ballot in just two or three days, at most, out of the two weeks that statutes allow them before they must certify the election. The only cost would be the hand-counters’ time at $10 or $12 an hour—a tiny fraction of the county’s elections-administration budget. They could randomly select just a few races for verification—just enough to deter election thieves in the races most liable to attract their interest.
And yet, collectively, they refuse.
Now, the bright notes: The Commission ignored the WCCA’s whining and voted unanimously to encourage county clerks to start auditing during their canvass. And as the WCCA memo states, a few county clerks have begun voluntarily to incorporate hand-counted audits into their routine canvass procedures.
Every county clerk in Wisconsin received a memo on October 4 explaining the current nationwide move to election auditing and providing the clerks with instructions on how to get started.
Only voters, though, can make it happen. Voters who care about election security should contact their county clerk to find out whether their votes in future elections will be protected with hand-counted audits during the county canvass.
If not, the next election on February 19 will provide an excellent opportunity for your clerk to begin developing routine election-audit practices, since it will likely be a low-turnout election. Your county clerk has plenty of time before February to learn about the various methods of checking accuracy and work out his or her local procedures.
Insist on it.